INTRODUCTORY* Teleology, ok Moeal Causation. 1. Man aim 8 Before studying the laws which gov- at Fruition — ie, ern human actions, it is useful, ...

Volumes I and II provided a completely new translation of the philosophical works of Descartes, based on the best available Latin and French texts. Volume III contains 207 of Descartes' letters, over half of which have previously not been translated into English. It incorporates, in its entirety, Anthony Kenny's celebrated translation of selected philosophical letters, first published in 1970. In conjunction with Volumes I and II it is designed to meet the widespread demand for a comprehensive, authoritative and accurate edition (...) of Descartes' philosophical writings in clear and readable modern English. (shrink)

Is knowledge possible? If so, what can we know and how do we come to know it? What degree of certainty does our knowledge enjoy? In these two powerful works, Descartes, the seventeenth-century philosopher considered to be the father of modern philosophy, outlines his philosophical method and then counters the skeptics of his time by insisting that certain knowledge can be had. He goes on to address the nature and extent of human knowledge, the distinction between mind and body, the (...) existence of God, and the existence of external objects. (shrink)

The coming of bioethics -- The coming of bioethicists -- "Choices on our conscience": the inauguration of the Kennedy Institute of Education -- "Hello, Dolly": bioethics in the media -- Celebrating bioethics and bioethicists -- Thinking socially and culturally in bioethics -- Reminiscences of observing participants -- Bioethics circles the globe -- Bioethics in France -- The development of bioethics in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan -- The coming of the culture wars to American bioethics.

German description: Descartes' Meditationen von 1641 haben bis heute die philosophische Reflexion immer wieder herausgefordert. In diesem Werk geht er von einer Haltung radikalen Zweifels aus, macht dann aber geltend, dass selbst ein ausserster Skeptizismus nicht die fundamentale Wahrheit, dass ich existiere, in Frage stellen kann: ego sum, ego existo. Ausgehend von dieser Gewissheit versucht Descartes, die Grundlagen einer neuen Wissenschaft zu legen. Ursprunglich auf Lateinisch verfasst, wurden die Meditationes 1647 ins Franzosische ubersetzt. Diese Ubersetzung wurde von Descartes selbst durchgesehen (...) und bearbeitet und unterscheidet sich in vielen Nuancen vom lateinischen Original. Diese Ausgabe ist die einzige, die neben der neuen Ubersetzung ins Deutsche den lateinischen Text wie auch die franzosische Version bietet. Erganzt wird sie durch einen umfangreichen Kommentar. Sie eignet sich damit besonders als Arbeitsbuch fur Studenten. (shrink)

First published in 1923 as part of the Cambridge Plain Texts series, this volume contains Descartes' Discours de la méthode in the original French. A short editorial introduction in English is also included. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the works of Descartes and the development of rationalism.

Based on the new and much acclaimed two volume Cambridge edition of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes by Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, this anthology of essential texts contains the most important and widely studied of those writings, including the Discourse and Meditations and substantial extracts from the Regulae, Optics, Principles, Objections and Replies, Comments on a Broadsheet, and Passions of the Soul.

Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, (...) argue that such contents are best construed in terms of mind-dependent properties. Other representationalists, including Tye and Dretske, hold that these contents involve only mind-independent properties. Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed an account of perceptual experience that would serve these latter representationalists extremely well. She suggests that we can do justice to the perspectival character of perceptual experience by appeal to representations of a certain type of relational properties, so-called ‘situation-dependent properties.’ In this paper, I critically engage with Schellenberg’s proposal in order to show how mind-independent representationalists can explain perspectival character. I argue that appeal to situation-dependent properties is problematic. I then show that mind-independent representationalists can account for perspectical character by means of scenario contents in Christopher Peacocke’s sense. (shrink)

This work was originally published anonymously.

The Elzevirs printed Descartes' philosophical works in quarto format six times between 1644 and 1677, and the parts of each ed. were sold together and separately, in many different combinations; cf. Willems, 1008. The present configuration of texts consists of the first 3 works of the 1650 (2nd) ed.--the Principia, Specimina, and Passiones animae-- to which has been added the 1654 ed. of the Meditationes.

The Elzevirs printed Descartes' philosophical works in quarto format six times between 1644 and 1677, and the parts of each ed. were sold together and separately, in many different combinations; cf. Willems, 1008. The present configuration of texts consists of the first 3 works of the 1650 (2nd) ed.--the Principia, Specimina, and Passiones animae-- to which has been added the 1654 ed. of the Meditationes.

Descartes et Freud ont pour véritables soucis fonciers, l'un l'évidence, et l'autre l'étrangeté. Il est remarquable qu'ils ne déterminent ces notions qu'implicitement, de façons réellement paradoxales. Cela peut surprendre, surtout si l'on ajoute que leurs façons sont identiques. A partir de la décision cartésienne d'identifier le vrai à l'évident se trouve fondée la science ; et l'identification freudienne du vrai à l'étrange fonde la psychanalyse. La question de la relation entre science et psychanalyse porte donc, ici, sur le réel du (...) nouage paradoxal entre les deux déterminations du vrai pointées par Descartes et Freud, sur leur différence et leur inséparabilité. Plus spécifiquement, c'est d'abord du point de vue du rapport entre mathématique et psychanalyse que la question est approfondie. La visée du livre est de construire le principe de ce nouage, de ce nœud hétérogène. La ressource centrale est de considérer comme vitale, tant au jeu de l'évidence qu'à celui de l'étrangeté, la question de la lettre. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Presents a scientific method based on hypothesis and deduction which replaced techniques derived from Aristotle, and includes extracts from Descartes' ...

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three dimensions of the (...) color solid: hue, saturation, and lightness. I argue that a viable version of representationalism needs to renounce this restriction to three dimensions and consider illumination to be a genuine phenomenal dimension of color. My argument for this thesis falls into two parts. I first consider the phenomenon of color constancy in order to show that neither Russellian nor Fregean representationalism can do justice to the phenomenal significance of local illumination. I subsequently formulate a version of representationalism that accounts for illumination by taking it as a phenomenal dimension of color. (shrink)

Many viewers presented with a round plate tilted to their line of sight will report that they see a round plate that looks elliptical from their perspective. Alva Noë thinks that we should take reports of this kind as adequate descriptions of the phenomenology of spatial experiences. He argues that his so‐called enactive or sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content explains why both the plate's circularity and its elliptical appearance are phenomenal aspects of experience. In this paper, I critique the (...) phenomenal adequacy of Noë's sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content. I begin by showing that some of its central claims are in conflict with the phenomenology of perceptual experience. I then argue that shape appearances have no phenomenal reality, thus undermining this central motivation for his account. (shrink)

GNèS LEJBOWICZ. — Pour comprendre votre réflexion, pouvez-vous nous parler en introduction de votre parcours au sein de l’armée ? 2 JEAN-RENé BACHELET. — Je ne suis pas un officier « de droit divin » ; mon père a été tué dans la Résistance, et j’ai été enfant de troupe à 10 ans. Je suis d’une génération qui est à cheval sur deux ères : celle d’un temps ancien qui se termine avec la fin du monde bipolaire et celle (...) de temps nouveaux, chaotiques et ouverts par une exceptionnelle conjugaison de ruptures, notamment géostratégiques. (shrink)